第二章 欧洲均势体系及其终结

字数:895

  1. Marquis de Custine,Empire of the Czar: A Journey Through Eternal Russia (1843; New York: Anchor Books, 1990), 69.

  2. Epistle of Filofei of Pskov, 1500 or 1501, as quoted in Geoffrey Hosking, Russia: People and Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), 5–6. 伊凡之后的历代继任人后来给这一哲学理念又加上了一层地缘政治意义。叶卡捷琳娜大帝想出了一个“希腊计划”，其最终目标是收复君士坦丁堡，封恰好与该城同名的她的孙子为当地统治者。她的弄臣波将金甚至在主子前往克里米亚的道路一侧做了“通往拜占庭之路”的标记（同时还假造了根本不存在的村庄）。对俄国（一个缺少不冻港的帝国）来说，收回失去的东正教首都成为一个具有深远的宗教和战略意义的目标。19世纪一位泛斯拉夫知识分子尼古拉·丹尼列夫斯基对这一思想脉络的概括振聋发聩：从我们国家建国之初起，君士坦丁堡始终是俄国人民渴望的目标，代表了我们的启蒙理想，象征着我们祖先的荣耀、辉煌和伟大，既是正教的中心，也是欧洲和我们之间的争议点。如果我们不理睬欧洲，能把它从土耳其人手中夺回来，君士坦丁堡对我们该有多大的历史意义啊！我们在阿亚索菲亚大教堂穹顶上放置的十字架放射出的光芒会多么令人欣喜！且不说君士坦丁堡还能带来诸多其他好处……它在世界上的地位、商业重要性、迷人的地理位置以及南方的一切魅力。”Nikolai Danilevskii, Russia and Europe: A View on Cultural and Political Relations Between the Slavic and German-RomanWorlds (St. Petersburg, 1871), as translated and excerpted in Imperial Russia: A Source Book, 1700–1917, ed. Basil Dmytryshyn (Gulf Breeze,Fla: Academic International Press,1999), 373.

  3. Vasili O. Kliuchevsky,A Course in Russian History: The Seventeenth Century (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), 366. See also Hosking,Russia, 4.

  4. John P. LeDonne,The Russian Empire and the World, 1700–1917: The Geopolitics of Expansion and Containment

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 348.

  1. Henry Adams,The Education of Henry Adams (1907; New York: Modern Library, 1931), 439.

  2. Orlando Figes,Natasha’s Dance: A Cultural History of Russia (New York: Picador, 2002), 376–77.

  3. 1864年俄国军队开进今天的乌兹别克斯坦时，外交大臣戈尔恰科夫把俄国的扩张定义为完全靠自身力量驱动的平定周边地区的一项永久性的义务：

国家（俄国）因此必须做出一项抉择：要么放弃这一不间断的努力，从而导致边界地区动乱不已，难以实现繁荣、安全和文化进步；要么不断向荒蛮之地纵深挺进，每向前走一步，长途跋涉造成的困难就会增大一分，这不是出于野心，而是出于紧迫的需要。最难的是不需要再往前走。

George Verdansky, ed., A Source Book for Russian History: From Early Times to 1917(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1972), 3:610.

  1. Marquis de Custine, Empire of the Czar, 230. 现代学者对此仍在进行研究。 See, for example, Charles J. Halperin, Russia and the Golden Horde: The Mongol Impact on Medieval Russian History (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1985); Paul Harrison Silfen, The Influence of the Mongols on Russia: A Dimensional History (Hicksville, N.Y.: Exposition Press,1974).

  2. 彼得大帝事必躬亲的霸气作风令西欧国家感到惊奇。他在荷兰时去码头当木匠，在伦敦时拆卸钟表，再把它们修好。他还尝试牙科医学和解剖学领域里的新成果，令他的随从提心吊胆。See Virginia Cowles, The Romanovs (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 33–37; Robert K. Massie, Peter the Great (New York: Ballantine Books, 1980), 188–89, 208.

  3. B. H. Sumner,Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia (New York: Collier Books, 1962), 45.

  4. Cowles,Romanovs, 26–28; Sumner,Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia, 27; Figes,Natasha’s Dance, 4–6.

  5. Catherine II,Nakaz (Instruction) to the Legislative Commission of 1767–68, in Dmytryshyn, Imperial Russia, 80.

  6. Maria Lipman, Lev Gudkov, Lasha Bakradze, and Thomas de Waal, The Stalin Puzzle: Deciphering Post-Soviet Public Opinion (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013) （对当代俄罗斯人的民意调查显示，47%的人接受以下说法：“斯大林是一位睿智的领导人，他使苏联繁荣强大。”30%的俄罗斯人认同以下说法：“我国人民永远需要一位像斯大林一样的领导人。他将现身恢复秩序。”）

  7. Catherine II,Nakaz (Instruction) to the Legislative Commission of 1767–68, 80.

  8. Nikolai Karamzin on Czar Alexander I, as quoted in W. Bruce Lincoln,The Romanovs: Autocrats of All the Russias (New York: Anchor Books, 1981), 489.

  9. Halperin,Russia and the Golden Horde,126.

  10. Fyodor Dostoevsky,A Writer’s Diary (1881), as quoted in Figes,Natasha’s Dance, 308.

  11. Pyotr Chaadaev, “Philosophical Letter” (1829, published 1836), as quoted in Figes,Natasha’s Dance, 132, and

Dmytryshyn, Imperial Russia, 251. 恰达耶夫的评论因一针见血而广为流传，尽管当局马上查封此文，宣布作者有神经病，并把他置于警察监视之下。

  1. Mikhail Nikiforovich Katkov, May 24, 1882, editorial inMoskovskie vedomosti (Moscow News), as excerpted in Verdansky,A Source Book for Russian History, 3:676.

  2. Figes,Natasha’s Dance, 150.

  3. Lincoln, The Romanovs, 404–5.

  4. Ibid., 405.

  5. Wilhelm Schwarz,Die Heilige Allianz (Stuttgart, 1935), 52.

  6. 指1954年联邦德国决定加入大西洋联盟。它曾与今天新结成的伙伴打了一场残酷的战争，联邦德国做出的这一决定距它在战争结束时宣布无条件投降还不到10年。

  7. Klemens von Metternich,Aus Metternich’s nachgelassenen Papieren, ed. Alfons v. Klinkowstroem (Vienna, 1881), 1:316.

  8. Palmerston’s dispatch no. 6 to the Marquess of Clanricarde (ambassador in St. Petersburg), January 11, 1841, inThe Foreign Policy of Victorian England, ed. Kenneth Bourne (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 252–53.

  9. See Isaiah Berlin,Vico and Herder: Two Studies in the History of Ideas (New York: Viking,1976), 158, 204.

  10. Jacques Barzun, From Dawn to Decadence: 500 Years of Western Cultural Life (New York: Perennial, 2000), 482.

  11. Sir Lewis Namier,Vanished Supremacies: Essays on European History, 1812–1918 (NewYork: Penguin Books, 1958), 203.

  12. Otto von Bismarck,Die gesammelten Werke, 3rd ed. (Berlin, 1924), 1: 375.

  13. The battle was memorialized in classic literature on both sides, including Alfred Tennyson’s “Charge of the Light Brigade” and Leo Tolstoy’sTales of Sevastopol. See Nicholas V. Riasanovsky,A History of Russia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 336–39.

32.Allgemeine deutsche Biographie 33 (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1891),266. Metternich left office in 1848.

  1. Heinrich Sbrik,Metternich, der Staatsmann und der Mensch, 2 vols. (Munich, 1925), 1:354, as cited in Henry A. Kissinger, “The Conservative Dilemma: Reflections on the Political Thought of Metternich,”American Political Science Review 48, no. 4 (December 1954): 1027.

  2. Metternich,Aus Metternich’s nachgelassenen Papieren, 1:33, 8:184.

  3. Algernon Cecil,Metternich, 1773–1859 (London: Eyre and Spottiswood, 1947), 52.

  4. Metternich,Aus Metternich’s nachgelassenen Papieren, 1:334.

37.Briefwechsel des Generals Leopold von Gerlach mit dem Bundestags-Gesandten Otto von Bismarck(Berlin, 1893), 334.

  1. Ibid. (February 20, 1854), 130.

  2. Horst Kohl,Die politischen Reden des Fursten Bismarck (Stuttgart, 1892), 264.

  3. Bismarck,Die gesammelten Werke (November 14, 1833), vol. 14,nos. 1, 3.

  4. Ibid. (September 29, 1851), 1:62.

  5. Speech of February 9, 1871, in Hansard,Parliamentary Debates,ser. 3, vol. 204 (February–March 1871), 82.

  6. 与此形成鲜明对照的是，为普鲁士赢得统一德国的战争的战略家老毛奇当时曾计划在两条战线上采取守势。

  7. For stimulating accounts of these developments, see Christopher Clark,The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 (New York: HarperCollins, 2013) and Margaret MacMillan,The War That Ended Peace: The Road to 1914 (New York: Random House, 2013).

  8. See John Maynard Keynes,The Economic Consequences of the Peace (New York: Macmillan, 1920), Chapter 5.

  9. See Chapters 6 and 7.

第一章 欧洲：多元化的国际秩序第三章 伊斯兰主义和中东：世界乱局